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Bonaparte, the liberator
Luciano canfora
In the beginning of 1792, when the most dramatic changes of the Revolution had not yet been produced, and, however, the european powers considered the hypothesis of performing a military intervention in France in 
order to grant again to Louis XvI (who had been discredited before his people 
due to the escape from varennes) his full power, in Paris the “party of the war” 
was represented by the Girondists, particularly by Brissot and dumouriez. In 
april 20, with the so-called “Girondist cabinet”, the declaration of war was 
issued. as the emperor of austria had not responded to the French ultimatum, 
Maximilien Robespierre lined up, as of the first moment, against the choice of 
war. He was not, then, a member of the new parliament, the legislative assembly, 
but performed his battle in the club of the Jacobins, an important “pressure” 
group, but which was not yet a force of government. as of January the 2nd, 
Robespierre vigorously declared himself against the war, that is, especially against 
the Girondist pretense, or illusion, that “liberty” could be “exported”. “the most 
extravagant idea” said Robespierre, 
“that can be born in the mind of a political man is to believe that, for a people, 
it suffices to invade the territory of a foreign people at gunpoint to make them 
adopt their laws and their constitution. nobody loves the armed missionaries; the 
first advice that nature and prudence offer is to repel them as enemies.”
and further: “Wanting to grant freedom to other nations before having 
achieved it ourselves means to ensure, at the same time, our servitude and the 
servitude of the whole world.”
His speech shines due to its historical and political solidity. Robespierre 
(2000, t.vIII, p.81-2) reminds the Jacobins that the Revolution had been 
launched by the upper classes:
“the parliaments, the noblemen, the clergy, the wealthy people were the ones 
that drove the Revolution forward; the people appeared only afterwards. they 
changed their minds or wanted, at least, to stop the Revolution when they 
realized that the people could recover their sovereignty; but they were the ones 
that started it. Without their resistance and their mistaken calculations, the 
nation would still be under the domination of the despotism.”
and he continues:
“For that reason, in order to successfully ‘export’ liberty (that is, the Revolution) 
it would be required to count on the support from the upper classes in the 
nationalism at the centre 
and periphery of Capitalism
Luiz carLos Bresser-Pereira
nationalism is a particularistic rather than universalist ideology, and when it takes its most radical form, its consequences are terrible – more violent than those resulting from any other major capitalist 
ideology.  For this reason – and because the wealthy countries are loathe 
to see it in developing nations -, nationalism is always treated as a suspect 
ideology. However, as nationalism is the ideology that legitimizes nations, 
and seen as modern society is territorially organized into nation states, the 
ideology of nationalism is strong and omnipresent. other ideologies are also 
important, but as competition between nation states is the widest-reaching 
economic and political factor in global capitalism, nationalism, albeit often 
disguised and denied, has always played a central role.  
during the cold war, the main ideological conflict seemed to be that 
between liberalism and socialism; but as soon as the soviet union began 
to collapse, it became apparent that even the conflict between the united 
states and the soviet union was a clash of two nationalisms. Furthermore, 
when we look at the most extraordinary feat of political engineering in 
history (the construction of the european union), we can read it as a 
negation of nationalism – and indeed it was, if we consider the decision of 
France and Germany to restrain their nationalisms and no longer make war. 
However, we could also interpret the european union as an attempt to 
produce an ampler, multiethnic and multilingual “nation” – the european 
nation – through the formation of a broader nation state in which the 
various components nonetheless maintain their own national identities.1 
nationalism therefore continues to play a fundamental role in the political 
life of humanity. as Benedict anderson (1991, p.3) once observed: “the 
‘end of the nationalist era’ so insistently prophesied, is not even remotely 
close. In fact, the sense of belonging to a nation is the most universally 
legitimized value in the political life of our time”. 
nationalism is fruit of a capitalist revolution that also spawned 
another important, essentially bourgeois ideology, liberalism, as well as the 
ideological triumvirate of socialism, efficientism and environmentalism, 
whose origins are, respectively, the working class, the professional middle 
class and the middle class in general. Liberalism is the ideology of freedom 
of thought and expression and of economic freedom; it is the value/belief 
system that justifies both civil rights and the not necessarily radical thesis 
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of laissez-faire - the invisible hand.  What was originally a revolutionary 
ideology against the absolute state and mercantilism became one of the bases 
of modern conservativism. nevertheless, liberalism continues to be a pivotal 
accomplishment of humanity in terms of affirming civil rights and the state of 
law. 
nationalism, on the other hand, is the ideology that unifies a nation, 
it is the sense of common destiny that guarantees the cohesion a nation 
needs to protect its territory, organize a state and thereby a nation-state. It 
is the ideology of national autonomy, security and economic development. 
the nation, in turn, is a reasonably homogeneous social group that shares a 
common destiny and either has, or has the conditions to produce, a nation-
state – the territorial political units in into which humanity is divided under 
capitalism. nationalism is an originally bourgeois ideology, though with a 
popular connotation, as it only makes sense when capitalists, the working 
class and the professional class put aside their differences, embrace a common 
destiny and rally together in competition with other nations. 
socialism, for its part, is the ideology of social justice. Marx defined 
it as a mode of production, but this form of societal organization never 
concretized and there is no prospect of it doing so in the foreseeable future. 
In compensation, a large number of socialist values envisaging substantive 
equality among human beings have been incorporated into the legal 
frameworks of modern nation-states, where they have become part of the 
shared fabric of modern society. socialism is the ideology of social rights that 
primarily addresses minorities, the oppressed, the poor, the worker, women 
and ethnic minorities. 
efficientism – or the ideology of efficiency, to avoid the neologism – is 
the ideology of instrumental rationality, of the definition of the best or least 
costly means toward a given end, in other words, of efficiency and productivity.  
It is an originally technocratic or professional ideology that emerged over the 
course of the 20th Century, as families gave way to bureaucratic organizations 
as the fundamental units of production, giving rise to a new class of 
professionals or technicians who play a decisive role in society insofar as they 
have, or aim to achieve, a monopoly on the new strategic factor of production: 
administrative, technical and communicative knowledge. 
Lastly, environmentalism arose at the tail end of the 20th Century, 
when it finally dawned on humanity that industrial societies were destroying 
nature. this is originally a middle-class ideology, whether bourgeois or 
professional, but, unlike the other four ideologies, this is now one shared to 
greater or lesser degrees across all social classes. 
these five ideologies roughly correspond to the five major political 
goals of modern societies: security, liberty, autonomy and economic 
development, social justice and environmental protection. When these 
ideologies radicalize, they become anti-democratic and anti-human 
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fundamentalisms. this is true of liberalism, which becomes neo-liberalism, 
of socialism, which degenerates into statism, of efficientism, which can 
reduce progress to economic growth, and environmentalism, which can spin 
off into a denial of progress. this, however, is particularly true in relation 
to nationalism, which, when radicalized, defines itself on ethnic terms, 
ceases to be the driving-force of inter-national competition and turns inside 
against compatriots of different races or religions, eventually corrupting into 
racism.  Hence the democratic societies of the 21st century make agreements 
concerning their political goals in order to prevent ideologies from 
radicalizing and perverting. this is why, in talking of nationalism, it is not 
unusual to distinguish between ethnic nationalism and political nationalism. 
Whilst a nation may have one of its most solid bases in a given ethnicity, the 
nationalist radicalization of this trait clashes directly with the universal values 
modern societies developed and agreed upon in the universal declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948. 
Liberalism, nationalism and efficientism, socialism and 
environmentalism respectively correspond to the goals of liberty, security, 
and economic development, social justice and the preservation of nature. 
as these five goals are political, society pursues them through politics and, 
by extension, through the state.  as these goals are not always compatible 
amongst themselves, politics – the art of compromise and persuasion 
– attempts to combine them as reasonably as possible. the most advanced 
capitalist and democratic societies are nationalist, though this does not 
prevent them from being liberal, social and environmental as well. as neil 
MacCormick has observed (1999, p.67) “there is an important place in 
the contemporary world for liberal nationalism”, as there is also a place for 
social and environmental nationalism. It therefore makes no sense to define 
nationalism as did Mirsolv Hroch (2000, p. 88):  “nationalism stricto sensu 
is a vision that confers absolute priority to the values of the nation over and 
above other values or interests”. this, in fact, is a definition of fundamentalist 
nationalism.2     
nationalism is the unifying force in modern nation-states, that is, of 
the politico-territorial tripartite units of nation, state and territory into which 
modern humanity is distributed. In the nation-state, country or national 
state, the nation is national society, while the state is the constitutional/legal 
system and the organization it provides. In this sense, the state, endowed, 
by definition, with the power of coercion needed to ensure the rule of law, 
is the institutional instrument par excellence of the collective action of a 
nation.3 While the politico-territorial unit in the more advanced pre-capitalist 
systems was the empire, in capitalism this role has fallen to the nation-states 
that now cover the entire terrestrial globe. In empires, the old state had only 
one objective, security; the other four political goals emerged only with the 
capitalist revolution and separation.
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thus came the separation between public and private, between the 
state and national society, the latter sometimes bearing the connotation 
of nation, sometimes of civil society. Hence, nation and nationalism are, 
respectively, the societal form and ideology of capitalism; which is why 
ernest Gellner (1983), Benedict anderson (1991) and anthony d. smith 
(2003), despite their differences in theoretical lineage, associate nations 
with modernity, that is, with the capitalist revolution and economic 
development. only thus can we explain the sheer ideological force of 
nationalism within capitalism.
Montserrat Guibernau (1997) offers two other perspectives from 
which to understand nationalism – one essentialist, according to which 
nationalism derives from the ancient and immutable character of the nation; 
and the other psychological, which relates nationalism with the need for 
self-identification. However, while the first is simply an equivocal thesis, the 
latter is a result of nationalism and of the constitution of nations. the need 
to belong to a group stems from the essentially social nature of the human 
being, but this necessity has assumed, over the centuries, various forms that 
have nothing whatsoever to do with nationalism. 
the nation and civil society are two sides of the same politically 
organized society that began to emerge with the capitalist revolution and 
the formation of the modern state. While the nation is the form into 
which modern societies organize themselves in their pursuit of economic 
development, civil society is the way they arrange themselves to fight for 
liberty and social justice. In both cases, politically organized society is 
distinct from the “people” - here understood as a group of citizens with 
equal rights -, because in both the nation and civil society individual powers 
are weighed on the basis of their capacity for organization, knowledge 
and capital. nations, though identified with or unified by nationalism, are 
nonetheless composed of social classes bound by conflict.
In old societies, the only social class capable of organizing itself was 
the landed, armed oligarchy, which often confused itself with the state. 
However, with the advent of capitalism and the emergence of a new class 
- the bourgeoisie – , rich and powerful, but with no direct control over 
the state, society, now politically organized itself, was separated from the 
institution under the guises of the nation or civil society. It was Hegel 
who first took note of the separation in course between society and the 
state, referring to politically organized society as civil society or, tellingly, 
bourgeois society. 
at the same time, another term – nation – was being used to identify 
that same politically organized society. While civil society is a concept 
historically associated with the universal goals of liberty, justice and the 
protection of nature, the political goals the nation seeks are national 
autonomy and economic development. In order to organize itself politically 
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to achieve these goals, the nation needs the state as the instrument of its 
collective action and must also secure a territory so that it can then establish 
its nation-state. as such, a nation only really exists when a people has a state 
or is fighting for one with a reasonable chance of success. 
In this conception, the state is always the expression of society; it 
is the institution society creates in order to regulate the behavior of its 
parts and therefore ensure the obtainment of its political goals. If society 
is authoritarian, with the balance of power tilted wholly in the favor of 
the elite, then the state will be authoritarian. as these social disparities 
between the ruling strata and the people diminish, the state democratizes. 
the smaller the differences of power derived from money or knowledge, 
and the more cohesive the nation and civil society, the more democratic and 
stronger the state will be – and therefore the more capable of fulfilling its 
role as instrument of collective social action. 
the five ideologies of the modern society are present to greater or 
lesser degrees in the value and belief systems of each citizen, and in the 
respective institutions. as the political objectives they pursue are all final, 
but not necessarily compatible, what we see in our societies and states is a 
huge social compromise. each society looks for a reasonable combination 
of these five objectives and their respective ideologies. these combinations 
vary depending on level of economic and technological development, 
and this allows us to speak of models of capitalism. In this article I will 
concentrate on nationalism and, naturally, on the nation. 
Nationalism, nation-state and development
 nation and nationalism – the former, a form of society, the latter, 
an ideology – are two complementary social realities that emerged from the 
capitalist revolution. nationalists generally look for their national roots in 
bygone times – the Germans, for example, liked to identify themselves with 
the Germanic nation, the French with the ancient Gauls, but today there is 
near-consensus among scholars to the effect that the nations and national 
revolutions that led to the formation of the nation-states are a modern 
phenomenon (Hobsbawm, 1990; Hutchinson & smith, 1994; thiesse, 
2001).   
Walker Connor (1994, p. 154), studying the formation of the French 
nation – one of the oldest in the world – cites a study by eugene Weber, 
according to which “as recently as 1870, most of the rural population and 
townsfolk did not see themselves as part of the French nation, and many 
still did not as late as the outbreak of the First World War”. For each people, 
the capitalist revolution begins with the commercial revolution and the 
emergence of the bourgeoisie and ends with the Industrial Revolution that 
gives rise to the phenomenon of economic development; in other words, the 
process of the accumulation of capital and the incorporation of technical 
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progress, leading to sustainably higher per capita incomes. Between the two 
revolutions, or in conjunction with the latter, comes the national revolution, 
i.e., the formation of the nation-state and, therefore, the transformation of a 
people into a nation.  
nationalism remains essential after the national revolution, as 
economic competition between nations becomes increasingly stiff the more 
the markets open to it – it is therefore a nationalism expressed through a 
national development strategy or national competition strategy: a conjunct 
of institutions, policies, agreements and practices that create investment 
opportunities for entrepreneurs and unify the nation. 
a nation may not necessarily have a single language, single religion, 
or even a shared ethnicity, but it always has a common history capable of 
bestowing a reasonable degree of cultural homogeneity on a large social 
group, which is why, as otto Bauer (1979) pointed out, a nation has “a 
common destiny”.4 nations are social constructions because they endlessly 
cast and re-cast themselves through the history, myths and symbols with 
which they identify.  the fact that nations are essentially defined by the 
possession of a shared destiny means that they are a structure by which 
societies organize themselves politically. It is through nationalism that 
a society seals its identity and sets its goals. nationalism is just this self-
reflection, or, as Álvaro vieira Pinto (1960, p.307) suggests, it is “the 
authentic consciousness of the national reality”. nationalism is how a nation 
sees itself reflected in two fundamental objectives: economic autonomy and 
development. 
While a common religion is not a pre-requisite of nations, 
nationalism will often use religion as an agent of social cohesion and 
legitimization in its construction and consolidation of the nation-state. the 
first nation-state in history was england, and it is no accident that Henry 
vIII was the pioneer in the practice by founding the anglican Church. 
While the adverse reaction of wealthy countries to those developing today 
in the Middle east is largely associated with their religious fundamentalism, 
as in the case of Iran, in reality this is a manifestation of nationalism using 
religion as a form of legitimization – no more nationalistic, therefore, than 
was and is the very construction of Israel, likewise predicated on religion.5 
For their part, leftwing political movements in Latin america, such as in 
Morales’ Bolivia, are essentially expressions of nationalism – of the endeavor 
to obtain national cohesion and to construct a state to serve it as an 
instrument of development. 
there is a relationship of mutual reinforcement among the nation, 
state and nation-state: the first being a form of society; the second, its main 
institution; and the third, the politico-territorial unit proper to capitalism. 
the state expresses the nation, but the latter only exists if the state is 
constituted and, in addition to regulating the nation, also succeeds in 
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exercising sovereignty over a territory in which to situate the nation-state. a 
nation only warrants the name when it has become a society that not only 
has a shared destiny, but which is also cohesive and strong enough to obtain 
autonomy, equip itself with a state and a territory, and thereby establish a 
nation-state. 
these three social realities born of the capitalist revolution are, 
however, intrinsically linked to the objective of economic development 
because, insofar as capitalist societies define themselves by the accumulation 
of capital and incorporation of technical progress by companies in constant 
competition, these societies are inherently dynamic and, therefore, a 
necessary stage for economic development. Capitalism, for its part, is a type 
of societal organization whose legitimacy does not depend on tradition or 
strength, but on its capacity to produce more well-being. 
Finally, economic development is the very condition of national 
independence. this is why nations, one of the two forms of politically 
organized capitalist society, are always focused on their own security or 
autonomy and economic development. However, modern societies have 
other goals as well, such as liberty, social justice and the protection of 
nature. When these are the goals under discussion, we do not speak of 
nations, but of civil society. In fact, it is one and the same society, but 
the forms of interaction and the weights of the different players (always 
dependent on the capital, knowledge and organizational capacity of each 
member) vary according to how that society is organized as a nation in 
pursuit of autonomy and economic development, or as a civil society 
engaged in the struggle for liberty, justice and sustainable development.
according to ernest Gellner (1983), the most notable analyst 
of nationalism, human history can be divided into three stages 
– pre-agricultural, agro-literate and industrial -, and nationalism is the 
fundamental ideology of the third. In industrial societies, which I call 
capitalist, the nation-state is the form of politico-territorial organization 
that replaced the empire.  While in the more advanced pre-capitalist 
societies, Gellner’s agro-literate societies, the classical empires were content 
to conquer neighboring societies and exact taxes, but without interfering 
in modes of production, in industrial societies nation-states are basically 
concerned with industrialization or economic development, and so they 
require standardized modes of communication, shared by all of their 
members, in order to ensure rising productivity. this means that speaking 
a common language is a near-necessity, and public education an absolute 
pre-requisite, because it is education that will define the symbols of this 
shared social communication and teach the increasingly more advanced 
modes of production. In this context, nationalism “entails the imposition of 
high culture upon a society in which low culture was largely, if not totally 
prevalent among the population.  It means the bureaucratically supervised 
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diffusion of a language of technological communication through schools” 
(Gellner, 1983, p.57).
nationalism is therefore the product and instrument of the capitalist 
revolution, or modernization. In this process, in which a certain degree of 
social cohesion and political legitimacy is essential, the role of nationalism 
is to ensure national economic autonomy and development. nationalism 
is the ideology of the nation-state, which is, in turn, the form of politico-
territorial unity typical of capitalism. during the commercial revolution, 
the bourgeoisie did not organize itself into nation-states, but into city-states 
through which it could practice its small volume, high-risk, high-yield and 
monopolistic blend of long-distance trade. this form of commerce was 
effective enough to permit the accumulation of originary capital, but not to 
trigger the Industrial revolution. 
For this to happen, it would take economies of scale, incompatible 
with long-distance trade, but possible through the formation of large 
nation-states. thus the national revolutions preceded the respective 
industrial revolutions, giving rise to the first true nation-states: england and 
France.6 It is essentially these two economies of scale that are behind the 
association between the monarchy and the bourgeoisie in the constitution 
of the nation-state. What interested the monarchy was the expansion of 
its power, the bourgeoisie, the chance to expand its trade and make the 
transition to large industry. It is therefore no accident that the nation-state 
and nationalism are intrinsically identified with capitalist development. 
though originally a bourgeois ideology, as it was the bourgeoisie 
that stood to gain the most from the formation of the nation-state or 
national state, there had to be more to nationalism than just that. a 
dominant ideology only makes sense if, on one hand, it widens its sphere of 
influence and justifies the prevailing system of power whilst, on the other, 
also serving the interests of the dominated. nationalism, with the union 
of national society as its raison d’être, could only make sense if it also had 
some mass appeal. only thus could it garner the solidarity to rally men 
to the defense of the national territory - the patriotism it takes to make 
someone willing to die for his country – and to economic competition with 
other nations. nationalism had to be able to offer mutual gains for both 
the capitalists and the workers, and these could only derive from increased 
productivity and economic development. 
For the revolutionary socialists of the 19th Century, like Marx and 
engels, nationalism was unacceptable precisely because it affirmed the 
very solidarity that they, faced with the enormous exploitation that existed 
then, rejected. this was what made them internationalists.  at the same 
time as they denied that the workers could share the gains of economic 
development through pay-rises tied to increased productivity, they affirmed 
the utopian possibility of a global socialist revolution. History, however, 
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was beginning to show signs of what would become clear some time 
later: that this share was possible; that in capitalism, in the process of 
economic development, salaries do tend to rise in proportion to increases 
in productivity. However, this relatively balanced growth does not occur 
naturally: it depends on the active demands of the socialists. this is most 
likely why socialists – in other words, those who value social justice – are 
also nationalists and anti-Imperialists. It is not enough for them to struggle 
against the inequalities in their own nations, they also have to fight against 
inequality among nations – something obtained through their cohesion, 
nationalism and, consequently, their capacity to agree on a national 
development strategy.
Nationalism of the centre and the periphery
a counterpart to the nationalism of nations at the centre is 
internationalism; whilst for those on the periphery or in development, the 
counterpart is cosmopolitanism or even a colonial mindset.7 nationalism 
is the ideology of those who recognize the competitiveness that exists 
between nation-states, consider it the government’s duty to defend the 
national interest, i.e., national jobs, knowledge and capital, who believe that 
economic development should be achieved through investments financed 
with domestic reserves and that government decisions concerning national 
interests ought to be taken in accordance with national criteria. this 
concept of nationalism is valid as much for the citizens of developing or 
peripheral countries as for those of the wealthy, central nations. 
Reflecting on peripheral countries, Helio Jaguaribe (1958, p. 21) 
defined nationalism as “the proposition that configures and conserves 
an historically possible nation, considered necessary by its members, but 
still not politically formed”. the colonial or dependent mentality of the 
cosmopolitan implies the existence of a colonial inferiority complex that 
leads to the acceptance of the subordination of the nation as “natural”. 
For the cosmopolitan, the dependency of his nation is inevitable and 
perhaps not even damaging. He underestimates the competition between 
nations and the ideological hegemony of the centre; believes that the 
country does not have the resources to finance its development and that it 
therefore has no choice but to rely on foreign capital; reckons that a policy 
of confidence building is essential in order to secure access to this inflow; 
and understands that the government should make no distinction between 
foreign and domestic capital. However, an individual in a rich country 
with this same mindset toward developing countries would not be called 
cosmopolitan, but rather globalized or imperialist, because such points 
of view cater to the interests of imperial domination. or should such a 
person allow his leftist thinking coax him to reject nationalism in pursuit 
of a just and solidary world, perhaps the best description would be utopian 
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internationalist. a third stance would be that of the anti-imperialists who 
frown upon their nation’s exploitive designs. However, contrary to what 
occurs in peripheral countries, even those who reject imperialism on the 
part of their countries are still nationalists because of their identification 
with their nation. 
though the elites of wealthy nations are resolutely nationalist insofar 
as they have no doubts as to their government’s duty to defend national 
jobs, knowledge and capital, they frequently disguise this by branding the 
ideology ‘violent’ and advocating more interdependency and cooperation 
among peoples. this is the unconscious but effective rhetoric of domination 
– a means by which these elites neutralize the resistance of developing 
nations to their exploitation, or, at a more advanced stage, to their capacity 
for industrial competition. the nations of the developed world are well-knit, 
almost devoid of citizens who are not nationalists, such that the label ceases 
to be distinctive and can even take on a pejorative connotation applicable 
to other nations. In this manner, nationalism is rhetorically related to 
economic populism and its defenders identified with backwardness and 
resistance to modernity.  and should there be any resistance to this negative 
view, there is always the handy distinction between nationalism, which is 
bad, and patriotism, which is good. 
this condemnation of nationalism among wealthy nations is 
a throwback to their own internal experiences, to the days in which 
nationalism was expressed in anti-semitism or, like today, in a backlash 
against the immigrant. understood in these terms, nationalism is mere 
racism. However, it is important to note that this is not the type of 
nationalism we are talking about here, not only because it is radical, but 
because it is an ethnic nationalism that targets fellow countrymen and 
women whose citizenship it denies. It is this nationalism that led Pierre 
Birnbaum (1993), for example, to speak with indignation, not against 
nazism - the very limitrophic expression of ethnic nationalism -, but against 
the hatred that had created “two Frances”: one republican and rational, 
the other conservative and nationalist. though I recognize that this breed 
of nationalism is always skulking in the wings of any national society, this 
is definitively not the kind of nationalism to which I am referring in this 
article.
Partha Chatterjee (1993), for whom anti-colonial nationalism is a 
fundamental category, summed up the fate of nationalism in the post-World 
War two world as follows. In the 1950s and 60s, nationalism was seen in a 
positive light as part of the anti-colonial struggle, but, as soon as one began 
to think of modernization  in terms of economic development, nationalism 
was relegated to the background. By the 1970s nationalism had become a 
problem of ethnic policy. More recently, nationalism has come to be viewed 
by the rich countries and the developing nations ideologically subordinate 
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to them as “a dark, primitive and unpredictable force that is a threat to the 
calm and order of civilized life”. the result of this ideological operation of 
“accusing” others of being nationalists is the undermining of any possible 
resistance on the part of exploited and/or rival nations. It is one of the 
many ways through which the ideological hegemony of wealthy nations 
changes the meaning of words and exercises domination. 
nationalism is therefore implicit in the central nations, while 
among the peripheral countries, if not explicit, readily branches off into 
cosmopolitanism. When cosmopolitanism becomes dominant, as it did in 
Brazil between 1822 and 1930 and again from the early 1990s, the nation 
is weakened and the country can be best defined as a semi-colony rather 
than as a nation. Besides its origins in the ideological hegemony of the 
imperial powers, cosmopolitan is also the result of the temptation of the 
elites of developing countries to associate themselves with the ruling strata 
of the core countries as opposed to forming a national pact with their own 
people. 
In rich countries, where class struggle is always present, the elites 
have no choice but to establish some form of alliance with the rest of the 
society, because they need the nation. In peripheral countries, on the other 
hand, whilst the nation is likewise important to economic development, 
the elites all too often feel more comfortable siding with those of the 
dominant nations, thus reinforcing the thesis that “capital knows no 
frontiers” – a patently leftist argument that is actually false, but which 
favors imperial domination. as István Mészáros (1987, p. 15) reminds us, 
“colonial domination is traditionally inseparable from the local ruling class’ 
willingness to submit”.
Nationalism and Imperialism
nationalism is inevitable in relationships between nations –
international relations – because, should one utopian decide to relinquish its 
nationhood, rather than follow suit, the others will take full advantage of 
their neighbor’s naiveté.  Hence, in international relations, the realist theory 
that presupposes a nation’s defense of its interests prevails among players 
across the board. nationalism is a powerful ideology and it is present in 
both the relationships between similar nation-states competing against each 
other on the same stage and between the nations of the centre and those on 
the periphery. When it comes to equal nation-states, these nationalisms will 
sometimes clash and sometimes cooperate, but between ill-matched nations, 
such as between the centre and the periphery, imperialism will always 
emerge on the side of the strong and in inverse proportion to the anti-
imperialist nationalism of the weak. there are various historical theories of 
imperialism that here is not the place to run through (cf. Lawrence, 2005), 
suffice it to recall that imperialism is a necessary condition not least in the 
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power relations between nation-states, but in the measure of how advanced 
or backward one is in relation to the other. Rich and powerful nation-states 
do not submit rich but smaller nation-states to imperialism because of their 
strong mutual interests in solidarity. However, in relation to medium or 
low wealth states, imperialism is inevitable, though subject to change as the 
power balance shifts. 
In the first phase, when the level of development on the periphery 
is extremely low, the relationship is essentially one of exploitation, though 
as these countries industrialize, exploitation will gradually give way to 
competition. While competition between rich nations may be fierce, they 
have something very important in common – a high wage floor –, which 
nurtures their solidarity in the face of the periphery, where low wages 
confers a competitive edge. as such, while small wealthy nations are not 
imperialist, it is still fair to associate the imperial centre with the rich and 
the periphery with the developing countries. Large or small, central nations 
feel threatened by competition from the cheaper products coming in from 
the periphery along with a swelling influx of poor immigrants.  
When the balance of power is tilted heavily one way, imperialist 
relationships on behalf of the wealthy nations are inevitable, regardless of 
the wishes of this or that government. Just as inexorable is a relationship 
of imperialism between mid-wealth countries and their poorer neighbors.8 
However, a developing country’s power of resistance does not solely depend 
on its level of economic development, but on cultural factors as well. When 
they won their independence in the wake of World War two, the dynamic 
asian nations showed much more fervent nationalism than did the Latin-
american, whose independence had come some 150 years earlier. though 
there are many reasons for this, one key may be that the Latin-american 
elites shared or believed they shared the same race as their european 
dominators, which their Indian counterparts clearly did not. this racial 
connection helped the Latin americans associate themselves more readily 
with the central elites than with the asians. 
Furthermore, the higher cultural level of the Indian civilizations in 
existence before the fall of the imperial yoke, in comparison with those in 
pre-1500 Latin-america, cannot be ignored. While the West only managed 
to subjugate asia during the brief period of 1800 to 1950, imperial 
domination in Latin america lasted far longer and ran much deeper. In 
asia, one exception was the Philippines, which, in the absence of any 
significant civilization, was colonized as early as 1571 - first by the spanish 
and later by the americans – and would remain under imperial rule until 
1946. this is most likely why their elites, like those in Latin america, like 
to associate themselves with the West (Constantino, 1978). It is therefore 
no accident that per capita growth in the Philippines since 1950 has been 
much lower than that of their more dynamic neighbors.9       
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the empire/colony, centre/periphery relationship involves an issue 
of level of domination. the greater the disparity between the power of the 
empire and that of the colony, the more brutal is the former’s exploitation 
of the latter and the easier it becomes to co-opt the local elites. thus, when 
a peripheral country develops and begins to carry more weight in relation to 
the centre, the empire has to change its domination strategy. the one-sided 
balance of power can be total, as in the case of the european decimation of 
amerindian civilizations; or partial, as became the case in relations between 
the empires and the Latin american nations after their formal independence 
in the early 19th Century and, more partially still from the 1990s, when 
these countries, after sixty years of reasonable autonomy, subordinated 
themselves once again to the core nations. In this latter case, direct use of 
force becomes unimportant, what matters is ideological domination. 
In this respect, the armies of the core nations make way for their 
universities, cinema and trade associations. the crux today is to co-opt 
those intellectual elites whose interests do not clash with those of the 
centre in order to gain power over the business elites who have something 
to gain, but much more to lose. among the intellectuals, economists play 
a fundamental and strategic ideological role, which is why the centers put 
such effort into luring them into graduate and doctoral studies in their 
universities.    
under the most brutal forms of imperialism, the goal is to sack 
and enslave, while under more formal imperial regimes, it is to levy taxes. 
In the case of imperialism over semi-colonial nation-states, like those in 
Latin america after their formal independence, the modes of exploitation 
are much more sophisticated. For a long time, economic liberalism was 
a powerful weapon that was wielded to prevent peripheral nations from 
industrializing. Ha-Joon Chang’s Kicking away the Ladder (2002) remains 
the best account yet given as to how commercial liberalism was used by the 
rich nations as a tool of imperialist domination.
More recently, as it became apparent that industrialization was going 
to happen one way or another, new forms of exploiting and neutralizing 
development in the peripheral nations had to be found. Contrary to what 
many may think, the main instrument of new imperialism is not commercial 
globalization, but financial globalization.10 Commercial globalization is 
an opportunity which many mid-wealth nations are taking full advantage 
of in order to grow on the back of cheap labor. Financial globalization, 
however, only benefits the rich. the key idea is to open the capital accounts 
of peripheral nations while convincing them that they do not have the 
resources to finance their development and therefore “can only grow 
with foreign funds” – in other words, with current accounts in deficit and 
mounting external debt. the result is that the countries that accept this 
advice lose control over their own real exchange rates, which appreciate, 
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producing not growth, but rather an overwhelming substitution of internal 
reserves for external inflow and debt. 
In fact, the policy of growth through foreign capital merely 
strengthens the tendency toward exchange rate over-valuation that 
already exists in developing countries, especially those rich in natural 
resources that end up falling victim to dutch disease. Countries that do 
not check this tendency and strive to neutralize dutch disease, and, on a 
wider level, manage their exchange rates, find themselves condemned to 
sluggish growth rates. this is what is happening across Latin-america, 
with the exception of Chile and, particularly, argentina over the last 
five years. Meanwhile, the dynamic asian countries, which have rejected 
the conventional orthodoxy and preserved their national sovereignty, 
are experiencing soaring growth, catching up with and becoming stiff 
competitors of the core nations. 
When nationalism gains the upper hand on cosmopolitanism, as 
occurred in the 1930s in various parts of Latin america, the country 
acquires or reacquires the nationhood that allows it to compete 
internationally. as such, it assumes the vocation or role of the capitalist 
nation-state, which is to compete. this is not to say that nation-states 
cannot cooperate, indeed they cooperate precisely so that they can set the 
rules for competition. the united nations and other such multilateral 
agencies are the most significant result of this cooperation – though this 
does not imply any neutrality on the part of the members. some of these 
institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, which are controlled by shareholders, end up functioning as agencies 
of the rich nations, as was made clear during the foreign debt crisis of 
the 1980s, when they adopted a course of action clearly biased toward 
the rich countries, and again in the 1990s, when these agencies became 
the instruments of financial globalization and the foreign capital growth 
strategy.   
the Brazilian economy is currently showing very slow growth, at 
rates far lower than the other developing countries, especially its dynamic 
asian counterparts. according to the neoliberal logic, Brazil’s failure to 
develop is due to a “lack of reforms” and to the populism of our politicians. 
However, as I see it, this near-stagnation stems from an underlying political 
cause and its specific economic ramification. the political cause is the loss 
of nationhood that befell the Brazilians: the atrophy that attacked the 
nation in the late 1960s and that gathered pace  in the late 80s; while the 
economic cause is Brazil’s acceptance in the early 90s of the “strategy” 
proposed by our competitors up north, i.e., the conventional orthodoxy, 
and principally the policy of financial opening and growth through foreign 
capital inflow that saw control over our exchange rate spin from our hands 
(Bresser-Pereira, 2007).
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nations do not tend to fortify, rather they pass through moments 
of greater or lesser cohesion. this would explain the famous observation 
by ernest Renan (1993, p.55), for whom “a nation’s existence is […] 
a daily plebiscite”.  Without the constant renewal of a commitment on 
behalf of its members, and unless its nationalism is endlessly reaffirmed, 
a nation loses cohesion and can even disappear. In the case of Brazil, the 
ideology of nationalism prevailed from 1930 to 1960, and it was during this 
period that we saw the concomitant occurrence of the Brazilian national 
and industrial revolutions. In 1964, however, after a serious economic 
and political crisis, the two nationalist groups that had driven the earlier 
development – the industrial bourgeoisie and the public bureaucracy -, 
terrified by the political radicalization caused by the Cuban revolution of 
1959, brought an authoritarian military regime to power in Brazil. though 
both classes continued to be nationalist, over the course of the next twenty 
years nationalism lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the democratic sectors of 
Brazilian society. the theory of dependency that took hold after the 1964 
coup, and became dominant from the early 70s, played a decisive role in 
undermining nationalism by peremptorily declaring the impossibility of the 
existence of a national bourgeoisie in Brazil and by accepting association 
with, or submission to the north as a means toward developing in its absence.
ernest renan (1823-1892).
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toward the end of the 70s, as a kind of practical contradiction of 
the theory of dependency, a wide-reaching national and public pact was 
struck between the business class, working class and middle class that would 
culminate in the democratic transition of 1984. the new regime came to 
power in 1985, but was unable to handle the external debt crisis inherited 
from the 1980s and that descended into fiscal upheaval and inertial hyper 
inflation. this failure, allied with the theory of dependency, weakened the 
Brazilian nation still further, such that it was incapable, with the dawn 
of the 1990s, to withstand the neoliberal wave and, more broadly, the 
ideological hegemony of a united states that seemed irresistible after the 
soviet collapse.   Hence, since 1991, Brazil has faithfully adhered to the 
precepts of the conventional orthodoxy and achieved unsatisfactory growth. 
the only bright moment of competent economic policy during this period 
has been the Real Plan (1994) – a strategy to stabilize high inflation that 
was based on a national theory, largely developed by Brazilian economists, 
known as the inertial inflation theory, which was entirely at odds with the 
proposals of the conventional orthodoxy of the day.
Nationalism and particularism
of the five major contemporary ideologies, nationalism alone is 
particularist. according to Barbosa Lima sobrinho (1963, p.11), while 
patriotism or nativism, both of which to some degree overlap with 
nationalism, can look beyond conflicts of interest, “the substance of 
nationalism is an antagonism of interests or ideas”. the other ideologies 
that arise with nationalism are universal and can therefore be shared 
equally by all humanity. While even from a utopian perspective, the world 
could not survive without the other four ideologies, it could do without 
nationalism, as all men would be brothers - hence its rejection by that 
little seed of utopia embedded in us all. While liberalism and socialism’s 
proposals for economic and political organization are open to all humanity, 
those of nationalism are limited to a given nation. though liberalism 
recognizes this contradiction, it stops short of rejecting nationalism 
because it also understands that the national cohesion it promotes is what 
legitimizes bourgeois domination. the revolutionary socialists, on the other 
hand, true to the utopian element in their world view, reject nationalism 
out of hand, envisage a socialist revolution in the short-term and hold an 
internationalist credo, supposing that the working class of the wealthy 
nations will show solidarity with those in developing countries. 
ernest Gellner, as emphasized by Roman szporluk (1988, p.27), 
dismissed this thesis of solidarity as a myth: “For Gellner, it is nationalism 
rather than Marxism that is best equipped to deal with the political and 
social consequences of industrialization”.  However, this might look rather 
different to the reformists or social democrats, for whom nationalism can be 
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an important flag, insofar as they see economic development and therefore 
the national and bourgeois revolution as a condition for the creation of 
more equitable societies, on the one hand and because nationalism can help 
unite the nation behind the anti-imperialist struggle, on the other. Many 
others, such as Michael Löwy (2003, p.259), prefer to distinguish between 
nationalism and “national emancipation movements”, claiming that, 
“while national movements are emancipatory, nationalism is often a ‘false 
solution’”. 
the particularism at the heart of nationalism goes against the grain 
of the utopian aspirations of universal cooperation and solidarity, but is 
coherent with aspirations toward justice on the global level. as david 
Miller (1995; 2000, p. 177) has demonstrated in his work, nationalism and 
a people’s self-determination are key to global justice. More specifically, 
he claims that global justice can be resumed in three chapters: “the 
obligation to respect basic human rights on the global level; the obligation 
to refrain from exploiting vulnerable individuals or communities; and the 
obligation to guarantee all political communities the chance to achieve self-
determination”. Furthermore, nationalism is coherent with the logic of the 
society in which we live.
In pre-capitalist societies, depending on their level of development, 
individuals were organized into families or tribes, and later into families 
and empires, whilst in liberal capitalism they were organized into families, 
family-run companies and nation-states. under today’s technobureaucratic 
capitalism, people are organized into families, organizations and nation-
states. the social role we expect individuals to play is that they show 
solidarity to the family, company, associations and nation-state to which 
they belong. they are also expected to cooperate, as the functional logic 
of these three social systems does not rest on competition alone, but also 
on cooperation – required at the very least in order to set the rules for 
competition. nevertheless, this solidarity with family, company and nation-
state is rational. nationalism is nothing if not the basic solidarity of the 
citizen to his or her homeland or nation.
In the capitalism of the globalized world, more so than at any other 
moment in capitalist development, nationalism and a nation’s ability to fix 
an informal national development or competition strategy are essential if 
economic development is to concretize and catch-up occur. However, this 
fact is not enough to lead the citizens of developing countries – even those 
that have had no socialist revolution - to resist nationalist particularism. In 
addition to the bombardment of hegemonic thought raining down upon it 
from the north, another factor that holds against nationalism is its history 
of terrible violence.  When nationalism becomes radical it is far worse than 
liberalism or socialism, leading to war and even genocide. this makes it 
easier for the north, whose nationalism is not in play here, to delegitimize 
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nationalism in the south. nevertheless, the nationalism of the peripheral 
countries resists attack. 
nationalism is therefore alive and well in developing countries. Leyla 
Perrone-Moysés (2007) recently published an excellent book whose title, 
vira e mexe, nacionalismo, is a line from Mário de andrade. though this 
renowned essayist has little sympathy for nationalism, what she brings to the 
fore with this title is the ideology’s capacity for survival. though incessantly 
under fire from hegemonic and universalist criticism, nationalism holds 
out and, every now and then, pops up again. starting from the universalist 
perspective, Perrone-Moysés (2007) remarks on something that strikes 
her as a paradox: “In today’s world, globalized by the economy and 
information, we are simultaneously seeing a weakening of the nation-state 
and a relapse into nationalism. the more capital and information ignore 
borders, the more those borders are reinforced for and against individuals”. 
With this, she is criticizing the nationalism of the wealthy nations, which 
close their borders to the world’s poor at the same time as globalization 
strengthens its hold worldwide. 
However, there is nothing contradictory about this increase in 
nationalisms within the globalized framework. Globalization, as the 
consequence of a general opening of the markets, led to an extraordinary 
level of economic competition among nation-states, making it all the more 
necessary for these to be able to formulate national competition strategies. In 
other words, it has become still more necessary for the democratic, liberal, 
social, environmentally-minded nation of today to also be nationalist. 
one of the pillars of modern democratic theory is the protection of 
minority rights – first and foremost of the capitalist minority itself, but also 
of ethnic and cultural minorities. It is up to the Constitution of each nation-
state to guarantee these rights. However, international society has no such 
constitution, nor a state to enforce the only document that comes close to 
serving such a function: the universal declaration of Human Rights. as 
such, in the absence of this global state, there is nothing else for it than 
for nations to declare themselves as such and defend their own interests. 
For three centuries, since at least the Peace of Westphalia, nation-states in 
formation were concerned with establishing their borders, threatening war 
in balance-of-power diplomacy; since the end of the cold war, international 
policy has tended to drop the threat of war in international relations among 
major powers in favor of the fiercer economic competition among nations that 
is globalization itself (Bresser-Pereira, 2003).
deep within nations today there is mounting criticism against 
multiculturalist particularism.  ever-growing international migration 
toward the wealthier nations initially resulted in multiculturalism, but 
has more recently fostered a need for national integration.  In place of 
this multiculturalist political thesis of the recognition of the other that 
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increases the number of identities and conflicts, the new proposal is that 
this recognition be identified with equal rights to participation for all 
minority groups (cf. Fraser, 2007). this proposal makes sense in the 
context of a democratic nation-state, where the subject (the rights-bearer 
of which alain touraine speaks [2005; 2007]) is a reality: a citizen 
recognized by both the society and the law. However, it ceases to do so on 
the global level, where there is no global state to enforce those rights. the 
robust criticism someone like Zygmunt Bauman (2005) might make of the 
identitarism that has gained force in the contemporary world fails to draw 
this necessary distinction. on the internal plane of modern democracies it 
is possible for groups to identify themselves as subjects without negating 
the universal values of the societies in which they live because those values 
are guaranteed by the institution, but the situation is rather more complex 
on the global level, where there may still be universal values, but no laws to 
enforce them. Here, it is national identity that enables a group to join forces 
in order to secure their values and interests.  When these are based on 
competition, nationalisms tend to be softer and international cooperation 
more sprightly than under relations of exploitation, but in either case there 
is no alternative to nationalism, as the dominant principle in international 
relations is not cooperation.
In short, nationalism is one of the five major ideologies born 
of capitalism. Like the others, it is democratically legitimate so long 
as it rejects ethnic criteria and is adopted with moderation, eschewing 
fundamentalisms. When employed radically, nationalism is terrible, as are 
all other ideologies when converted into the kind of fundamentalisms that 
turn socialism into statism, liberalism into neo-liberalism, efficientism into 
technobureaucratic domination and environmentalism into an affront to 
science and technology. the nationalism endemic to democratic societies 
is liberal, efficientist, socialist and environmentalist, compatible with 
the degree of economic and political development modern societies have 
obtained.  It is a modern nationalism that rejects war, respects other 
nations and promotes international cooperation on problems that transcend 
national boundaries, such as global warming, contagious diseases, drugs 
and organized crime. In a highly competitive world, nationalism is essential 
if a country is to formulate a national economic development strategy and, 
if it happens to be a developing country, gradually attain the standard of 
living of the developed nations, but it has to be combined with the other 
major political objectives of modern societies and with respect for the rights 
of other nations. 
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Notes
1  the european union is not yet a nation, but already has a constitution, many laws, 
a commercial policy, budget, flag and single currency. 
2  this historian of national movements in eastern europe is aware of this and 
defines what we would normally call nationalism as “national movements” – “the 
concerted effort to obtain all of the attributes of a full nation” (Horch, 2000, 
p.87-8). this definition, however, is unacceptable. 
3  notethat I have distinguished between the nation-state and the state; the former 
is a politico-territorial unit while the latter is an institution. I can therefore use the 
plural “states’ to refer to nation-states, while the singular will always refer to the 
institution that, according to Weber, holds the monopoly on legitimate violence 
because it determines the law, is the law and has the power to enforce the law.
4  anthony smith (1994, p. 148) is generally seen as a scholar whose definition of 
nationalism involves a shared ethnicity. In fact, what he shows is that ethnicities 
are usually the origins of nations (which is not to say that they must stay that way) 
and that the transition from ethnicity to nation is both “difficult and problematic” 
and occurs when a lead group opts to create a state and subsequently effect the 
“bureaucratic incorporation” of the other social groups around it.  
5  Robert Pape (2005) studied 375 cases of suicide bombings in the Middle east and 
concluded that 95% of these attacks were primarily motivated by nationalism, with 
only 5% being religiously driven. 
6  I do not consider Portugal and spain among the first nation-states, because the 
Industrial Revolution, the crowning moment of the capitalist revolution, would 
only occur there much later on. 
7  I am using the term “cosmopolitanism”, originally employed by Helio Jaguaribe 
(1962), in avoidance of the stronger expression “surrenderism”. 
8  Relations between Brazil and Bolivia are a case in point. 
9  While average per capita income in Korea, taiwan, thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia grew nine-fold (1011%) between 1950 and 2003, per capita income in 
the Philippines a little less than doubled, to 136%.
10 david Harvey wrote a good book entitled new Imperialism, in which he stresses 
that the main form of this imperialism is ideological hegemony; thus the change 
in Imperial content between commercial opening and financial opening goes 
unnoticed. 
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AbstrAct - In this work I show that nationalism, together with liberalism, 
socialism, efficientism and the environmentalism, is one of the ideologies of 
the modern societies. In the first section, I define nation as the form of society 
politically organized that is born with the Capitalist Revolution and leads to the 
formation of the nation-state, and nationalism as the corresponding ideology: its 
objective is the autonomy and the national economic development. In the second 
section, I distinguish the nationalism of the central countries from that one of the 
peripheral countries; while in the first the nationalism is implicit, in the peripherals 
is explicit or then turn to the cosmopolitism. In the third section I argument that 
the imperialism, even being inevitable between strong and week countries, will 
change its characteristics when this relation of forces is modified as a consequence 
of the nationalism of the dominated ones. still in this section, I make one brief 
reference to Brazil. Finally, I come back to the ideologies of the capitalism to 
show that, differently from the others, the nationalism is a particularist ideology, 
which increases the resistance to it and facilitates the task of domination of the 
central countries. Yet, the nationalism does not disappear because it is an organizer 
principle of the capitalist society. 
Keywords - Ideology, nation, nationalism, Globalization.
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